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Abstract
Three years have gone by after the enlargement of the EU to 10
new member states. It is now possible to dismiss the fears on the
negative effects of this enlargement that circulated in Europe (and
not only) before 2004. What is more relevant to assess now is how
far the actual economic integration between the EU15 and the new
member states has arrived. This is the aim of this paper, where we
show that integration is indeed deep in a number of areas, but it is still
a goal in others. Pursuing an effective integration process is necessary
for all countries to benefit of the advantages created by the Single
Market.
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1 Introduction
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) to 10 new member states
(NMS) in May 2004 was saluted by many celebrations. The full member-
ship to the EU of eight countries formerly belonging to the Soviet bloc was
considered a historical event, that finally brought about the reunion of the
European continent, and stability and democracy in the Central and Eastern
European countries (CEECs). Few doubts were raised on the political divi-
dend of this enlargement. Much more discussion took place on the economic
consequences of the enlargement, both for the 15 countries that were EU
members before 2004 and for the 10 new member states (NMS) that joined
in 2004.
Many estimates were showing a number of potential economic benefits
following the EU enlargement.1 Thanks to the extension of the European
market to a larger number of consumers and firms, to the possibility to exploit
economies of scale and to expand the scope for technological spillovers for
all European countries, both small and large, the enlargement was expected
to generate an increase in GDP and to foster European competitiveness. In
spite of this, fears of possible negative effects and of high adjustments costs
circulated with the public. Some workers in the EU15 were concerned about
a possible wage competition coming from the workers in the new member
states, where salaries were much lower than in the EU15 and workers’ benefits
are smaller, and about possible migration waves jeopardizing their jobs. Some
firms in the old member states raised worries about ”‘unfair”’ competition
coming from firms located in the new member states, where production costs
were lower. The public opinion in the EU15 feared the the adjustment costs
for letting a large number of poor countries into the EU would have been
large.
Nearly three years after the enlargement of the EU to eight countries
formerly belonging to the Soviet bloc and after completing the Eastern en-
largement with the entrance of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007, it is
possible to dismiss these fears. So far, there are no signs of serious negative
effects on the EU economy because of the enlargement. Is the lack of any of
the expected negative effects due to the lack of a true process of integration?
If, in spite of the formal accession that has occurred, the economies of the
EU15 and the NMS have not experienced an increase in integration, it might
well be that nothing occurred after 2004. Of course, this would mean that
also the forecasted positive effects might not take place, after all. It was
1A summary and a review of these estimates is available in the EU Commission publi-
cation (2006) ”Enlargement, two years after: an economic evaluation”.
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underlined in all the simulations and analyses undertaken on the impact of
the enalrgement that it was likely that the costs of the process would have
been faced rapidly, while it would have taken time for the benefits to be re-
alized. If we have not seen negative effects so far because no true integration
is occurring, in the future we cannot expect to see the benefits of the process
either.
The aim of this paper is to look for some of the effects of the EU mem-
bership on the integration process between the EU old and new members,
focusing on the extent of trade between these two areas. We want to assess
whether for Central and Eastern European countries the EU membership
implies an effective economic integration, and a reduction of the ”‘border
effect”’ that hampers the economic exchanges between countries.
2 What did not occur
No major economic shock has hit the EU after the enlargement. In particular,
it seems that none of the negative consequences that worried the public
opinion has taken place. With respect to the financial sustainability of the
enlargement for the EU budget, the cost had been carefully calculated and
negotiated beforehand, and there were no surprises. EU transfers to the NMS
have been growing over time, and they increased after these countries joined
the EU to reach a relevant share of the NMS GDP (about 12 billion euro, or
2.1% of their total GDP). But these trasfers in 2005 made up only 0.1% of
the old members’ GDP and less than 7% of the EU budget, being therefore
fully sustainable. It is also worth remembering that after their membership,
the NMS must also contribute to the EU budget with an amount that is
approximately 1 percent of their own GDP, and therefore the net transfer
they receive from the EU budget is even smaller. Being the contribution to
the EU budget proportional to a country’s GDP, the larger NMS (the ones
that raised more fears about their impact on the EU) are also the ones the
receive a smaller net transfer. 2
Before 2004, many fears were concerned with the impact of the enlarge-
ment on labor markets and the level of employment in the EU15. After almost
three years, in the European labor market there are no signs of serious prob-
lems or disequilbria created by the enlargement. Overall employment rates
in Europe have been increasing slowly since 2001, with an acceleration since
2005 thanks to the improvement in the business cycle. The increase in the
number of jobs has been stronger in the old member states than in the new
2For example, the net EU transfer represent only 0.25% of the GDP of Hungary, while
they constitute about 2% in the case of Lithuania.
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ones. Unemployment rates do not appear correlated with the enlargement
process. The aggregate unemployment rate in EU15, that was up to 8.1% in
2004, was reduced in 2005 and 2006. In Germany, the main economic partner
of many NMS, the unemployment rate was stationary between 2004 and 2005
and it declined in 2006. Considering the labor market data over a longer time
span, the EU15 unemployment rate in 2006 is more than two points below its
level in the early 1990s. In the NMS, where generally unemployment rates
are much higher than in the EU15, long term unemployment is showing a
slowly declining trend. There are a few empirical detailed studies that try
to test if there has been a substutition effect between the employment of
workforce in the EU15 and in the NMS, and the results show that in the few
cases where a significant substitution effect seems to exist, this has affected
at most 1% of the labor force.
Another concern from the point of view of the NMS was the possible slow-
down of their GDP growth rates after joining the EU because their economies
would have been constrained by the adoption of the EU rules and regulations.
Also in this case there are no signs of a negative impact of the enlargement
on the economies of the member states. In the NMS the GDP growth rates
show no decline after 2004, and if there was an effect on GDP growth of the
enlargement, this seems rather positive, as the NMS continue to grow quite
rapidly.
The lack of any strong negative effects should in fact have been expected.
The difference in economic size between the NMS and the EU prevented
any serious disruption from occurring, and the pre-accession process further
reduced the impact of the enlargement. But the soft impact also makes it
difficult to assess the extent of the true process of integration. If with the
formal accession, the economies of the EU15 and the NMS experienced a
speed-up in the rate of integration, it might be that more changes should be
expected for the future. If instead we have not seen negative effects so far
because no true integration is occurring, in the future we cannot expect to
see the benefits of the process either.
We will see in the next section that this is not the case. In most sectors,
economic integration between the EU15 and the NMS proceeded rapidly well
before 2004, and it was accelerated by the accession. Of course, this has not
occurred in all sectors to the same extent, and there are areas where the
process of economic integration still needs to be completed.
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3 How much integration did occur?
Before dismissing the impact of the EU enlargement on the European economies
as negligible (both for the positive and the negative), it is important to eval-
uate the actual degree of integration that has been realised so far. Economic
integration is an ongoing process, that did not take place on May 1st, 2004,
but started much earlier and it is still on the way. Especially for the NMS, it
is important to complete the integration process with the other EU economies
to fully benefit from the new allocation of resources, the technology transfers
from the EU, and the pro-competitive effects of the EU market. But integra-
tion does not necessarily take place automatically when formal barriers are
removed. This is why it is necessary to consider some quantitative measure
of the effects of integration, and not only the removal of barriers in itself.
3.1 Trade integration
The most common measure of integration is the amount of trade taking place
between countries. The free circulation of goods and services within the EU
is also one of the pillars of the European single market. Therefore, to see if
now the single market is effectively extended to the NMS, we consider first of
all the amount of trade taking place within the EU25 and between the NMS
and the EU15.
Trade flows have increased rapidly between the EU15 and the candidate
countries already in the 1990s.3 In 2003, when most barriers to trade flows
had already been removed, even if formal membership was not achieved yet,
the EU15 was the destination of 67% of the future member countries’ exports
and originated 58% of their imports. For all of the NMS (with the only
exception of Lithuania) before the accession, the shares of trade with the
EU-25 were above the average of all members, and they were much higher
than the ones of many older members.
As shown in Table 1, the NMS share in intra EU-25 exports has increased
substantially in the last few years, and this is true for all the countries in-
volved. After the accession, the NMS shares in the EU15, which were increas-
ing since the mid-1990s, experienced an acceleration. During the 1990s, the
share of the EU15 in the NMS markets has remained substantially stable, but
since 2004 the rate of growth of imports of the NMS has increased remark-
ably. After the accession, there has been an expansion in the intra-EU25
trade flows, also because the amount of trade among the NMS expanded.
The relevance of the NMS in EU trade is much higher than their weight in
3On the trade patterns between the EU15 and the future member states, see De Bene-
dictis and Tajoli 2007a and 2007b.
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Table 1: New member states exports
Value of export Value of export Average yr. growth of Country’s share in
(to EU25 to EU15 exports to EU15 intra EU25 exports
1999 2005 1999 2005 1999-2003 2004-2005 1999 2005
Czech Rep. 21581.7 52977.2 17289.7 41655.5 15.06 18.02 1.43 2.46
Estonia 1937.7 4802.6 1644.0 3717.0 16.12 16.92 0.13 0.22
Hungary 19344.2 38335.3 17902.2 32855.8 12.28 8.29 1.28 1.78
Lithuania 1899.0 6203.5 1371.0 4024.4 19.05 23.27 0.13 0.29
Latvia 1254.7 3167.9 1010.4 1960.4 12.27 11.33 0.08 0.15
Poland 20770.3 55495.9 18089.9 46730.3 16.37 19.61 1.38 2.58
Slovenia 5856.3 10293.8 5302.2 8854.2 5.74 15.88 0.39 0.48
Slovakia 8471.7 21993.4 5698.9 14854.7 20.21 12.51 0.56 1.02
Total NMS 81115.7 193269.5 68308.4 154652.2 14.50 15.48 5.37 8.98
Source: our elaboration on Eurostat Comext data.
terms of GDP. Therefore, if we use the trade over GDP ratio as a measure
of integration for the NMS, this appears to be very high.
Table 2: New member states imports
Value of import Value of import Average yr. growth of
(to EU25 to EU15 imports to EU15
1999 2005 1999 2005 1999-2003 2004-2005
Czech Rep. 20396.1 49976.2 17151.3 41021.4 12.39 24.29
Estonia 2355.9 6122.4 2099.3 4770.7 11.10 24.66
Hungary 18599.9 35857.7 16930.4 30525.5 8.47 14.74
Lithuania 2608.7 7410.2 2052.1 5137.7 16.63 16.76
Latvia 2087.6 5254.8 1510.3 3054.1 11.92 13.84
Poland 30897.4 61100.7 27959.1 53446.0 7.30 20.60
Slovenia 7240.7 12792.4 6527.8 11344.0 6.07 17.64
Slovakia 7892.5 22147.0 5491.7 13778.1 17.10 15.90
Total NMS 9.73 19.48
Source:
our elaboration on Eurostat Comext data.
The descriptive evidence on the high degree of trade integration is con-
firmed by a statistical analysis of trade flows between the EU15 and the NMS
using a gravity model, which also shows that the negotiation process and the
preparation of the NMS to the accession indeed fostered the economic in-
tegration between the two areas. The basic gravity model regression using
bilateral total exports between the NMS and each EU15 member was run on
different years, and results are reported in Table 3. Overall, the results of
the model are good, showing a high goodness-of-fit, and coefficients with a
high significance and the expected signs.
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Our attention is focused especially on the distance variable, whose coeffi-
cient should capture the relevance of the barriers to trade between the trading
partners, the trade costs and other obstacles to trade. The interpretation of
the coefficient of the distance variable has been discussed at length in the
literature.4 In particular, there is evidence that distance captures more than
transport costs, and that larger ”‘distance”’ may be associated with greater
information and search costs (Loungani et al., 2002). This kind of interpre-
tation is very much in line with what occurred right after the elimination
of the ”‘iron curtain”’ and during the early phases of transition in Central-
Eastern Europe, when information on the CEECs was very scarce and this
constituted a barrier for many economic transactions.
In our estimates the distance variable is significant in all regressions, with
a fairly high coefficient, like it usually occurs, but it is interesting to see that
the coefficient of this variable declines significantly between 1999 and 2002.
Given that the geographical distance used to measure this variable is by def-
inition constant over time, this result means that distance mattered less over
time. In other words, the declining value of the distance coefficient can be
taken as an indication of the reduced ”separation” or the increased integra-
tion between the two areas in that period. This reduction fits well with what
occurred along the pre-accession process of Central-Eastern Europe, when an
increasing amount of information was collected on the candidate countries to
evaluate their readiness to join the EU, and more Western firms got in touch
with Eastern counterparts, spreading the knowledge of the characteristics of
the CEECs’ economies.
The value of the coefficient does not display a similar decline between
2002 and 2005, and this seems to show that not much more integration
occurred in the last couple of years with the advent of EU membership.
These results though are obtained considering trade in the aggregate, and
they hide important differences between sectors.
Finally, the contiguity dummy variable in the regressions is positive and
significant in nearly all cases, and it does not reduces its coefficient over
time. This result confirms that not all EU15 members wee affected by the
EU enlargement in the same way, and that proximity to the NMS enhances
the enlargement effects.
4On the possible interpretation of the distance coefficent, see Disdier and Head (2004)
and Buch et al. (2004)
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3.2 FDI integration
Foreign direct investments (FDI) are another important indicator of economic
integration, and they can promote an acceleration of the process through
technology and capital transfers. But in terms of foreign investments, the
degree of economic integration between the EU15 and the NMS is lower
than integration in trade. Even if Central and Eastern Europe received large
flows of FDI since the 1990s, the total amount is still small if compared to
the amount of intra-EU15 FDI that are taking place each year, and it is not
comparable to the large wave of mergers, acquisitions and investments that
characterized the creation of the European single market in the early 1990s.
The inward FFDI stock in the NMS in 2004 was close to 40% of their GDP,
which is a sizeable rate, but still below the 45% ratio given by the inward
FDI stock over GDP in EU15.
FDI statistics are not updated frequently like trade statistics, and they
are available with a lower degree of disaggregation, so that it is still difficult
to get a clear picture of FDI flows within Europe after the enlargement.
The last available data show a remarkable increase in intra-EU FDI flows in
2005, largely due to increased flows between EU15 member states. In 2004
and 2005 FDI flows increased significantly also from the EU15 to the NMS,
but these flows amount only to 6.5% of total intra-EU25 FDI flows. It is
worth noting that FDI flows are also slowly increasing between NMS (see
Table 4).
Table 4: Intra EU flows of foreign direct investments (billion Euro)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Intra EU25 FDI flows 365.5 361.1 247.0 187.0 339.4
From EU15 to NMS 17.8 13.0 7.9 14.2 22.1
From NMS to EU15 1.1 1.3 0.7 4.3 8.3
Between EU15 members 346.2 345.8 237.4 167.0 307.8
Between NMS 0.4 0.9 0.6 1.5 1.2
Source:
Eurostat
A gravity equation run on bilateral FDI flows between the EU15 and
the NMS produced results which are somewhat different from the regression
run on trade flows. First of all, the goodness-of-fit of the regression for FDI
is much lower: it is plausible that a gravity-type regression for FDI might
have serious problems of omitted variables if some indicator of attarctiveness
for investors in not included. Also, the distance variable was not always
9
significant and the contiguity dummy was never significant. The only variable
turning out to be always positive and significant is the NMS GDP, indicating
a possible market effect attacting FDI toward the larger CEECs. The overall
poor quality of the results for the FDI gravity equation can be explained in
many ways, but they seem to indicate that this is a poor specification to try
to measure the degree of integration of production activities between the two
areas.
The available evidence indicates that so far a large part of the FDI inflows
into the NMS are more closely related to the process of privatization and
transformation of their economies than to a re-organization of production
within the EU following the enlargement. But such a re-organization is
likely to occur soon, especially if the European economy gathers momentum.
Even if the NMS are less attractive than they used to be in terms of labour
costs because of their fast catching-up process, their membership into the EU
gives a number of guarantees to investors, and facilitates business operations,
making them in many other respects an even more important location for
investments than they used to be. This leads to think that a new wave of
FDI might come in the future.
4 Is there an ’enlargement effect’?
After the formal accession of the NMS into the EU, it is not assured that the
process of economic integration would continue at the same speed. In fact, on
the one hand, once the goal of membership has been reached, it could be that
the process looses its impetus because the political will to pursuit it might
be less strong, and because the easiest opportunities to reach have already
been exploited. On the other hand, the removal of the remaining obstacles
could speed up the on-going process. In order to see if there are differences
in the integration process before and after that EU membership was reached,
we consider again trade flows as indicator of ”revealed” integration and we
compare what happened before and after 2004. Looking at total trade flows
in Tables 1 and 2, all NMS (with the exception of Slovakia) experienced a
increase in the rate of import’s growth from the EU after the enlargement,
and on average this rate increased sharply. The increase in their exports
toward the EU was much more moderate, even if in 2004-2005 their export
growth increased by 1%, and reached 15.5%. These figures are in line with
the results of the gravity model discussed in the previous section, where it
was difficult to find an effect of the enlargement of trade data.
These aggregate data hide a diversified situation at the sectoral level.
Sectors that were still not fully exploiting their trade potential before the
10
enlargement experienced a clear increase in trade after 2004. One of these is
certainly agriculture. In 2004, agriculture in the NMS was still employing a
comparatively large share of the labour force and producing a relevant share
of GDP.5 But trade with the EU in this sector was strongly regulated before
the full membership, and the export potential of the new members was not
exploited. We observe a sharp increase in the export flows of the NMS in
agricultural goods toward the EU after 2004. This is a sector were we can
clearly observe an enlargement effect. Other sectors display an increase in
trade flows after the enlargement, because other barriers were removed, and
more opportunities opened up (see Table 5).
In order to assess the significance of such an ”enlargement effect”, we
checked for the existence of a statistically significant change in the values of
trade flows after 2004. This test was performed by running a regression of the
trade flows (exports and imports separately) of the NMS toward the EU15
on a time trend, and by introducing into the regression a dummy for the last
two years, the membership period. A statistically significant coefficient for
such a dummy variable would indicate a break in the trade flow series after
the enlargement.
When regressing total exports of all the NMS toward the EU15, the time
trend coefficient is positive and quite significant, confirming the increase
over time of trade integration already discussed. But the introduction of
an enlargement dummy does not improve much the goodness-of-fit of the
regression, and the dummy is not significant.
Therefore, even this statistical test shows no clear structural break in
trade flows after 2004. If we move to consider total export flows country by
country in separate panel regression over sectors and time, the enlargement
dummy was again not significant for any of the NMS with the only exception
of Slovenia. This is somehow unexpected, given that Slovenia was already one
of the countries most advanced in terms of integration before the enlargement.
In spite of this, for this country full membership seems to have mattered
significantly.
The last set of regressions considers the enlargement effect on trade in
individual sectors. The enlargement dummy turned out to be quite signifi-
cant for a few sectors, when the regression was run across countries and years
for each individual sector. First of all, the significant enlargement effect is
confirmed statistically in the agricultural sectors, both for processed and pri-
5The labor share employed in agriculture was 3.9% in the EU15 in 2004, but it reached
19% in Poland, 10% in Slovakia, and it is above 4% in all the NMS. Also in terms of
contribution to the national value added, agriculture has a higher share in the NMS than
in the EU15, even if the gap between the figures in this case is much smaller because of
the high productivity differences.
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mary agricultural goods, and especially for agricultural goods destined to
industrial production, confirming an increased integration in the EU food
industry. Other industries like passenger motor cars or durable consumption
goods also show a significant increase of the rate of growth of exports follow-
ing the enlargement, but when trying to assess statistically an ”enlargement
effect” this turns out to be non-significant (see Table 6). There are also in-
dustries, like for example capital goods, or parts and accessories of transport
equipment where the coefficient of the trend variable is positive and signif-
icant over the entire time span, but the growth rate of exports decreases in
the last couple of years, and in fact the enlargement dummy in the regression
turns out with a negative (but non significant) coefficient. In these sectors
it is very likely that the integration effect has been at work much before the
actual membership of the NMS, and the enlargement did not produce any
specific effect on trade flows.
Unfortunately, there are few updated data on exchanges in the service
sector. This is a key sector, where integration could be very important for the
NMS, that generally suffer a disadvantage especially in the business sectors
vis-a`-vis the EU15. Looking at the trend of export of services of the NMS
up to 2005, this has been on average much flatter than the trend in exports
of goods, with an yearly increase of export which was about half the one
of goods. The trend of the EU15 exports of services toward the NMS has
been instead more in line with their exports of goods, reflecting the different
structure of their economies. It is worth remembering that even if in services
trade integration is far from being complete, in this sector a large part of
integration occurred through FDI: of the total stock of FDI from EU15 to
the NMS, more than half took place in services. For services, data don’t
allow to check for an enlargement effect yet, but it will be interesting to
see if membership into the EU has effectively removed the (often invisible)
barriers to trade in services.
5 Conclusion
The extent of the changes brought about in the NMS by the EU membership
has been different from country to country. These differences depend very
much on the pre-existing specialization of the country. In general though, the
EU enlargement did not bring about large changes in the EU after 2004, also
because it was anticipated by a preparation process that led to a high degree
of integration already before full membership was reached. The proximity to
a large and rich market open to their exports and the quick re-orientation of
their trade flows toward this market has been a key factor in fostering this
14
transformation already during the 1990s. In this respect, Central-Eastern
Europe enjoys a key advantage with respect to other economies, and this
advantage is reflected in a more diversified and more technologically advanced
export pattern already in the early 2000s.
The evidence shows that the integration process in many sectors was well
underway before the EU enlargement. This is not to say that there were
no effects after the EU enlargement. The statistical analysis undertaken on
trade data shows that in quite a few sectors integration (measured in terms
of increased trade flows) was accelerated by the membership.
More changes are likely to take place also in the future. Even if the
catching up process of the NMS was generally fast, there still exist a produc-
tivity gap that should close down between the countries that joined the EU
in 2004 and the EU15, and an even larger gap for those who entered later.
Increased integration through high flows of trade and investments, and the
re-organization of production in the EU that includes all 27 members can
speed up further this process of convergence.
Of course, the increasing convergence of the NMS and of the other CEECs
toward the income levels and the specialization patterns of the rest of Europe
will require some adjustment in the old member states, as the initial division
of labour that was worked out between the EU15 and the CEECs is becoming
obsolete.
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